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Background This paper presents an analysis of the main characteristics of the Gulf
Cooperation Council’s (GCC) health ﬁnancing systems and draws similarities and differences
between GCC countries and other high-income and low-income countries, in order to provide
recommendations for healthcare policy makers. The paper also illustrates some ﬁnancial
implications of the recent implementation of the Compulsory Employment-based Health
Insurance (CEBHI) system in Saudi Arabia.
Methods Employing a descriptive framework for the country-level analysis of healthcare
ﬁnancing arrangements, we compared expenditure data on healthcare from GCC and other
developing and developed countries, mostly using secondary data from the World Health
Organization health expenditure database. The analysis was supported by a review of related
literature.
Results There are three signiﬁcant characteristics affecting healthcare ﬁnancing in GCC
countries: (i) large expatriate populations relative to the national population, which leads
GCC countries to use different strategies to control expatriate healthcare expenditure; (ii)
substantial government revenue, with correspondingly high government expenditure on
healthcare services in GCC countries; and (iii) underdeveloped healthcare systems, with some
GCC countries’ healthcare indicators falling below those of upper-middle-income countries.
Conclusion Reforming the mode of health ﬁnancing is vital to achieving equitable and
efﬁcient healthcare services. Such reform could assist GCC countries in improving their
healthcare indicators and bring about a reduction in out-of-pocket payments for healthcare.
© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management published
by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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BACKGROUND
To date, in spite of their unusual characteristics and demographic challenges, the
healthcare ﬁnancing systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have
attracted little interest. Unlike other high-income countries, where the people are the
main source of healthcare funding (Wang et al., 2010), or in low-income countries,
where external assistance resources could be an important source of healthcare*Correspondence to: A. Alkhamis, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, University of Liverpool,
Pembroke Place, Liverpool, L3 5QA, UK. E-mail: alkhamis@email.com
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e65FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESﬁnancing, GCC countries ﬁnance their healthcare services from the revenues of
natural resources (oil or gas). Furthermore, GCC countries have unique demographic
characteristics that determine how their healthcare systems must be ﬁnanced. One
example is the very high percentage of expatriate residents (Shah, 2009). Clearly,
GCC countries have characteristics that differentiate them from both high-income
and low-income countries.
In the analysis of healthcare ﬁnancing, a common approach found in the literature
is based on economic development. This literature usually categorizes countries on
the basis of their income: developed countries are usually classiﬁed as high-income
countries, and developing countries are usually classiﬁed as low-income countries or
in economic transition (Carrin and James, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006;
McIntyre, 2007; Mills, 2007). However, some countries can be classiﬁed as high-
income developing countries. GCC countries such as Bahrain, Oman and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) are considered high-income countries as per the World Bank
classiﬁcation level of income (The World Bank, 2010). In addition, these countries
share the urbanization rates of developed countries (The World Bank, 2009). On
the other hand, they also share the characteristics of developing countries, such as
low literacy rates, poor health proﬁle and challenges in the process and delivery of
healthcare (UNDP, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 2009). For example, GCC countries face
ﬁnancial challenges, including health ﬁnancing (WHO, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c,
2006d, 2006e). However, whilst for some GCC countries a few aspects of healthcare
ﬁnancing have been discussed (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005; Sekhri et al., 2005), they
were not classiﬁed as high-income countries.
Our study sought to identify the main characteristics of GCC health ﬁnancing
systems and focuses on both the similarities and differences between GCC countries
and other high-income and low-income countries, in order to provide recommenda-
tions for health policy makers. Included here are some of the ﬁnancial and quality of
care implications that can be related to the implementation of the Compulsory
Employment-based Health Insurance (CEBHI) scheme in Saudi Arabia, which was
recently introduced as a strategy for ﬁnancing healthcare services.METHODS
To facilitate the analysis of healthcare ﬁnancing in GCC countries, we (i) employed
a descriptive framework (as outlined later), (ii) compared and analysed publicly
available secondary data on GCC and other developing and developed countries
from the World Health Organization (WHO) health expenditure database (WHO,
2010a) and (iii) conducted a literature review of related documents, including
unpublished reports about the future of healthcare and ﬁnancing of health services
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
A framework for the analysis of healthcare ﬁnancing
A descriptive framework (Figure 1) developed by Joseph Kutzin (2001), for the
country-level analysis of healthcare ﬁnancing arrangements, which can assist in© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: e64–e82.
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Figure 1. Framework of health system ﬁnancing functions developed by Joseph Kutzin
e66 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.determining policy options, was adapted to conceptualize different components of
GCC health ﬁnancing resources. This framework comprises revenue-raising
mechanisms (i.e. sources of pooled funds and contribution methods), the pooling of
healthcare revenues (i.e. the accumulation of prepaid healthcare revenues on behalf
of a population), purchasing (i.e. the transfer of pooled resources to service providers
on behalf of the population, for which the funds were pooled), the provision of
services (i.e. the market structure of services), out-of-pocket (OOP) payments and
the beneﬁts package (i.e. not simply a list of services to which the population or
beneﬁciaries of an insurance scheme are entitled, but those services and means of
accessing services, for which the purchaser will pay from pooled funds).
Data on healthcare ﬁnancing
Given the importance of consistency in the methods used to measure national health
accounts (The World Bank, WHO, et al., 2003), for the comparison and analysis of
national health expenditure for each GCC country, as well as amongst countries from
a range of income groups (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle
income, low income), data were selected from a single source to ensure that
comparisons were based on the same estimation and data collection methods; hence,
the paper uses existing data on health ﬁnancing from the WHO health expenditure
database. Microsoft Ofﬁce Excel 2003 was used to tabulate each country’s data or
income group. The organization of data is by health ﬁnance function (WHO,
2010a). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize health expenditure data on
GCC countries, as shown in Table 1.
Literature review
By using electronic and hand searches, a review of the limited available literature on
GCC healthcare ﬁnancing methods, including the CEBHI, was conducted. This
comprised all articles, reports and ofﬁcial documents that addressed the ﬁnancing© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: e64–e82.
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e69FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESof healthcare in GCC countries from 1992 to 2012. The review drew on a range of
different sources, including government documents, books, newspapers, databases
(Scopus, Science Direct, ISI Web of Knowledge, JSTOR and PubMed), specialized
websites (International Labour Organization, WHO, the World Bank and Google
Scholar) and conference papers on Saudi health insurance. The keywords used in
the literature search were as follows: GCC healthcare ﬁnancing; Saudi health
ﬁnancing; Saudi health insurance; health ﬁnancing in high-income countries;
ﬁnancing of healthcare in low-income countries; the ﬁnancing of healthcare in
GCC countries; the ﬁnancing of healthcare in Arab countries; the ﬁnancing of
healthcare in the Middle East; and strategic planning in Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE,
Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, in combination with the keywords, a
range of generic words were included in the searches (e.g. expatriates, social health
insurance and minorities).1 Moreover, given that much of the required literature
would be in Arabic, a parallel literature search in Arabic was undertaken within
Arabic search engines. Finally, keywords relating to the Saudi healthcare system
were used, including healthcare systems in Saudi Arabia, healthcare in Saudi Arabia,
Saudi health insurance, access to healthcare in Saudi Arabia and healthcare
utilization in Saudi Arabia.
This study was granted approval by the King Abdullah International Medical
Research Centre through grant number RC09/084, upon recommendation of the
Research Committee, following the review of the Institutional Research Board on
the ethical aspects of the proposal.RESULTS
Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ strategies for controlling healthcare
ﬁnancial resources
The GCC countries have substantial expatriate populations. Expressed as a
percentage of the population, Kingdom of Bahrain has 40.7%; Kuwait, 68.8%;
Oman, 24.4%; Qatar, 78.3%; Saudi Arabia, 25.9%; and the UAE, 71.4% (Shah,
2009). These countries share the objective of minimizing government health
expenditure by reducing expatriate healthcare expenses. However, each country uses
different strategies. For example, the Ministry of Health (MOH) in the UAE requires
all expatriates to pay annual fees for using government healthcare services and
additional fees for prescription drugs and diagnostic tests such as X-rays (WHO,
2006j). More recently, the state of Abu Dhabi in the UAE implemented a law
obliging all employers to provide health insurance cover for employees and their
families under three insurance schemes: one for Nationals (thiqa), one for unskilled
labourers and lower-paid employees (basic) and one for higher-skilled expatriates
(enhanced). A study found differences in the utilization of medical care amongst
these schemes (Koornneef et al., 2012), in that those nationals within the majority
high-income group utilized medical services more than those belonging to the1Further information on the literature search strategy is available from the authors.
© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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e70 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.expatriate labour worker low-income group. However, the impact of the Abu Dhabi
reform is still in its early stages, having been implemented within Abu Dhabi only,
as opposed to the entire UAE. By contrast, the Kingdoms of Bahrain and Kuwait use
a cost-sharing method to control expatriate utilization of public services. Expatriates
pay fees for visiting a district health centre, non-emergency treatment, surgical
procedures, normal delivery and other medical services and procedures (WHO, 2006f).
Similarly, in Oman, all expatriates in the private sector must be covered by their
employer or sponsor (WHO, 2006h).
Saudi Arabia is one of the few GCC countries to have reformed its private
healthcare system and reduced expatriate access to government resources. If the
CEBHI proves to be an effective scheme for increasing expatriate access to medical
care, it could be adapted by other GCC countries, not least, because most of the GCC
countries are currently looking into different mechanisms to ﬁnance their healthcare
services. For example, Qatar’s recently developed strategic plan mentioned that a
health insurance scheme will be implemented, following lessons learned from
neighbouring countries (Ministry of Health Qatar, 2011). In addition, one of Oman’s
national strategic plans was to use health insurance as a tool to reduce healthcare
expenditure (Ministry of Health Oman, 2006); however, this did not identify any
means of achieving the objective. Although some authors identiﬁed ﬁnancing
options for ﬁnancing healthcare services in Oman, the appropriate ﬁnancing method
to be implemented was not discussed (Al Dhawi et al., 2007). The Kingdom of
Bahrain recently examined different options of health insurance as a means of
increasing access to medical care to all individuals (Ministry of Health, 2011). The
Kuwait national healthcare system is in the process of reforming its healthcare under
the new Kuwait Health Assurance Company, which will affect both nationals and
expatriates alike (Marius, 2011).
In the next section, Kutzin’s descriptive framework is adapted to conceptu-
alize different components of Saudi Arabia’s health ﬁnancing resources in
connection with GCC countries, as well as low-income, middle-income and
high-income countries.
Finance and resource allocation functions
Collection of funds. Oil, a commodity with a ﬂuctuating price, is the main source of
revenue for ﬁnancing healthcare in GCC countries (Sturm et al., 2008). Like other
GCC countries, the Saudi government, according to the law, is obliged to provide
free healthcare services for its citizens, as per article 31 in the basic role of
governance (Government, 1992 ; Hediger et al., 2007). Many countries including
Qatar, a GCC member, use a dedicated part of their ‘sin taxes’ (excise duties
imposed on alcohol, tobacco or gambling) to ﬁnance some of its healthcare activities
(WHO, 2004), although this source of revenue is very limited. However, alcohol and
gambling are forbidden in Saudi Arabia, and a tobacco tax has never been used to
ﬁnance healthcare; even so, scope remains for its introduction given the prevalence
of tobacco use.2 Overall, therefore, the bulk of healthcare funding in Saudi Arabia2Saudi Arabia is ranked fourth globally for its tobacco consumption(Arabiya, 2012).
© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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e72 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.comes from the government’s annual budget; 90% of which is derived from oil
revenue (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2008). Other sources are too limited
to be considered adequate for ﬁnancing healthcare services.
Government expenditure. The GCC governments’ expenditure on health as a
percentage of total healthcare expenditure in 2008 is high compared with that of
other high-income countries (Table 1). On average, the GCC countries’ general
government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure is
72.5%, whereas the average is 62.2% for high-income countries (WHO, 2010c,
2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h). However, the expenditure on health as a
percentage, or by per capita, of general expenditure in GCC countries is low,
compared with that in other high-income countries. For example, in 2008, per capita
government expenditure on health (PPP Int. $) is $857,3 whereas the same ﬁgure in
high-income countries is $2609. Despite this, GCC countries (except Oman) are
between the upper-middle-income and high-income countries in terms of per capita
government expenditure on health.
Despite concern regarding the level of general government expenditure on health,
it is also the case that GCC countries, as with other Middle Eastern countries, are
characterized by fragmentation of the health system. This leads to fragmentation of
healthcare ﬁnancing (Gericke, 2004; Ministry of Health Oman, 2006; General
Secretariat of the Executive Council, Department of Planning, and Economy,
et al., 2008; Ministry of Health, 2011; Supreme Council of Health, 2011; Al Razzi
Holding, 2012). As can be seen in Figure 2, the healthcare funding in Saudi Arabia
is split amongst more than eight different government agency budgets, and each
agency provides health services for its own targeted population. However, the
MOH in Saudi Arabia is the main healthcare provider, accounting for approximately
60% of all health services. Other government ofﬁces provide comprehensive health
services for their employees and dependents. These providers have maintained a
fairly static proportion (approximately 20%) of hospital beds since 1995 (MOH,
1995; MOH, 2003; MOH, 2008), and their budgets are allocated directly from the
Ministry of Finance through their respective ministries or agencies. As these groups
provide services independently, an individual could potentially have a medical record
with all of these groups, whereas other citizens may not have access to any facilities
because of the non-availability of services. The beneﬁts offered by these groups are
more extensive than those covered by the MOH (Al-Sharqi and Abdullah, 2012).
Therefore, in the context of the Saudi healthcare system, the per capita distribution
of general government expenditure on health is likely to be inequitable because of
the fragmentation of the healthcare budget amongst different government agencies.
Private-sector expenditure. Prior to the implementation of CEBHI, the major
source of income for private healthcare services was Saudi individuals, capable
of paying OOP expenses and private companies; whereas expatriates who
worked in big leading companies received voluntary health insurance through
their employers as one of their recruitment beneﬁts. However, there were health
insurance companies prevalent in the market without regulations (Mufti, 2000).3This ﬁgure is based on the average per capital government expenditure on health (PPP int. $) amongst
GCC countries.
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Figure 2. Main healthcare suppliers, management and providers in Saudi Arabia (designed
by authors)
e73FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESThe implementation of the CEBHI has had a clear and positive impact on
payment methods: OOP payments decreased, and private insurance expenditure
has increased (Table 1). After the implementation of CEBHI, between 2006
and 2008, there was a huge increase (more than 10%) in private insurance as
a percentage of private-sector expenditure on health as a consequence of which,
not surprisingly, OOP payments decreased (approximately 4%) (WHO 2006f).
The actual proportion of private expenditure from total health expenditure did
not change much (from 18% in 2006 to 22% in 2008) (WHO, 2010f). However,
in theory at least, because expatriates comprise almost one-third of the population
in the private sector, the share of private expenditure would need to be increased
to reﬂect the proportion of the private sector population in Saudi Arabia. In
addition, the percentage of Saudi and expatriate workers in private and government
companies is 30% of the total population (excluding families) (GOSI, 2008).
This segment of the population should receive healthcare services through
the private sector (Table 2). Therefore, in accordance with the population
makeup, private expenditure on healthcare ought to be more than 30% of the
total expenditure on health. However, in 2008, private-sector expenditure on health
as a percentage of total health expenditure was only 22%. There are several reasons
for this relatively low expenditure:
• Low private expenditure is related to the need for more legislation, an unclear
vision of the private sector and manpower challenges (Hediger et al., 2007). These
reasons apply to all GCC countries. In the Saudi Arabian context, the law for
private healthcare services states that at least one of the owners of a health centre
must be a physician, thereby discouraging businessmen from investing in
healthcare (Cabinet of Ministers, 2002). As a result, the number of healthcare
providers during 2006–2008 did not expand as quickly as the number of new health
insurance companies (Alkhamis, 2008a, 2008b). For example, according to a
report from the MOH, the increase in private health services has not kept abreast
of the huge increase in demand on the private sector since 2006 (MOH, 2008).
• The growth of private-sector expenditure on healthcare between 2006 and 2008
(54%) was more than the government growth percentage (22%). The large© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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e74 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.increase (31%) in gross domestic product between 2006 and 2008 meant that
although the growth of the private sector (54%) between 2006 and 2008 was
more than the government growth percentage (22%), the impact on total health
expenditure was small, given the dominance of government expenditure in total
expenditure4, when considering the ﬁnancial implications of CEBHI. However,
private-sector expenditure was higher prior to the implementation of CEBHI.
For example, private-sector expenditure on health was more than 30% of the
total expenditure in 1995 funded from OOP expenses (Table 1). When government
expenditure on health was low, private expenditure increased, mainly via OOP
payments, and this mode of ﬁnance reached 48% in 1998 (WHO, 2010f).
• The CEBHI scheme linked the granting or renewal of a residency permit
(Iqama) to the conﬁrmation of the provision of a cooperative health insurance
policy (Cabinet of Ministers, 1999). There would have been a large number of
expatriates whose Iqamas were not due for renewal at the time of implemen-
tation in late 2008, meaning employers could have avoided meeting their
obligation. There are also reports that some employers pay insurers ‘under
the table’ to renew employee residency permits, without the employees
actually having health insurance (Alsaedi, 2011). These reports require further
investigation to assess the volume of this fraud and the impact this has on
private-sector expenditure.
In addition, the law governing the supervision of cooperative insurance was only
developed in 2003. Prior to this, the health insurance market was under
development, and as a consequence, the relationship between healthcare providers
and insurers was unregulated. One of the main reasons behind this delay was the
resistance from some Islamic scholars who believed that commercial insurance
should not be permissible in Islam. Importantly, the constitution of Saudi Arabia is
based on the Holy Quran and the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammed’s recorded sayings
and actions), and the health insurance scheme must be linked to the constitution of
the country. Only cooperative health insurance and not-for-proﬁt health insurance
are permissible under Islam. The term ‘cooperative health insurance’ has been used
for CEBHI, which has led to legislation being passed, but it has been suggested that
CEBHI does not meet the criteria of cooperative health insurance because the money
goes back to the insurance company owners (Al-Dussary, 2009). The religious
acceptance of insurance was based on the Fatwa of the Council of Senior Scholars,
published in 24 March 1977 on cooperative insurance, but this Fatwa does not apply
to the current practice of health insurance because it is now private and commercial
(Al-Ashak, 2009; Al-Dussary, 2009). The resistance to health insurance prior to
approval was apparent during the Council’s voting. The members voted equally
(50% accepting and 50% rejecting the scheme) (Majilas Al Shora) (Alrabiah,
2009), with the Council Chairman’s vote being responsible for the passing of the
health insurance scheme before eventually being approved by the Royal Cabinet.4The private expenditure on health increased after the implementation of CEBHI by more than 54%, from
SR8490bn to SR13 107bn between 2005 and 2008, respectively, but the government expenditure on
health increased from SR37 283bn to SR45 537bn during the same period.
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e75FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESPooling of healthcare revenues. The line item budget is the main budget format
used in GCC countries for the government healthcare sector; hence, the pooling of
healthcare revenues is ﬁxed and isolated from the demand side. Recently, some of
the GCC countries have been moving to change their budget format in order to
improve the ﬁt between the demand and supply sides. For example, Qatar, which
already has a system of national health accounts, announced in its National
Development Strategy 2011–2016 that they want to enhance their monitoring and
control of healthcare expenditures. To this end, Qatar will be making the change
from lump sum budgets to either activity-based or performance-based budgeting as
soon as practicable (Ministry of Health Qatar, 2011).
As already indicated, the pooling of healthcare revenues in the private healthcare
sector is fragmented. In Saudi Arabia’s CEBHI context, health insurance companies
provide cover based on risk-based pooling similar to voluntary health insurance; that
is, insurers charge different premiums for different risk categories and different company
sizes. Therefore, the size of the premiums for small employers is critical to the success of
the CEBHI scheme, especially because between 2006 and 2007, around 50% of the
total number of expatriates were employed by small employers (GOSI, 2008).
Purchasing. Because there is no separation between the purchase and the provision
of healthcare in the government sector, providers are paid directly in GCC countries.
However, in Saudi Arabia’s private healthcare sector, the CEBHI is part of a
market-oriented system, with competition from other providers. The situation is
therefore similar to that in the USA, where competition exists between the healthcare
providers and health insurance companies. However, in the USA, the competition
amongst healthcare providers and health insurance companies has not helped reduce
costs, with the presence of many purchasers diluting incentives for providers
(Relman, 2007). Speciﬁcally, having multiple purchasers has led to different costs
for the same health condition or an adjustment of the charges for different purchasers
of the same services (Hsiao, 2007; Relman).
Provision of services. Although healthcare expenditure and per capita expenditure
in GCC countries are higher than those of upper-middle-income countries, the
GCC countries’ healthcare indicators are lower than those of upper-middle-income
countries. For example, the density of health personnel in most GCC countries
per 10 000 people is still less than that of upper-middle-income countries
(WHO, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h). Similarly, the number of
beds per 10 000 people in Saudi Arabia and GCC countries is less than that of up-
per-middle-income countries (Table 1). However, after the implementation of the
health insurance plan in Abu Dubai between 2009 and 2010, the total number of
healthcare providers grew by 12.4%5 (Dhabi, 2010). In the Saudi Arabian context,
a huge disparity exists amongst healthcare providers because of a lack of
standardization (Al-Sharqi and Abdullah, 2012). In addition, the majority of
healthcare centres and hospitals operate in rented buildings and lack the essential5Unfortunately, at the time of writing, there were no data available to assess the contribution of this expan-
sion on the quality of care.
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e76 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.requirements for operating a healthcare facility (Al-Sharqi and Abdullah, 2012). On
the other hand, only a few tertiary public healthcare facilities provide state-of-the-art
technology with a high-quality of care, but these are difﬁcult to access and hence
have fewer patients (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002).Out-of-pocket payments. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, most GCC countries
share the dominance of OOP payments for the ﬁnancing of healthcare with low-
income countries. In Saudi Arabia, since the introduction of the CEBHI scheme,
OOP payments have decreased, and private insurance expenditure has increased
(WHO, 2010f). In the region more generally, when government expenditure on health
is low, private expenditure, speciﬁcally OOP payments, tends to be high (WHO,
2009). OOP payments in low-income countries accounts for 56% of the total health
expenditure, but only 14% in high-income countries (WHO, 2010f). A recent study
showed that 49% of health ﬁnancing in the Middle East comes from OOP payments
(Elgazzar et al., 2010). Although the study did not include GCC countries, the OOP
payments in GCC countries are high but for different reasons. Firstly, some GCC
countries charge expatriates for the use of government health services. For example
in Kuwait, with the highest level of private household OOP payments amongst GCC
countries, expatriates have to pay for all types of healthcare visits, including visits to
primary healthcare centres (WHO, 2006g). Secondly, GCC countries are high-
income countries, and some citizens, if they prefer, have enough money to pay for
private facilities, as evidenced by the practice in Qatar (WHO 2006i). In Saudi
Arabia, before the implementation of CEBHI, and because of the low quality of
public health services, the major source of private-sector expenditure was Saudi
individuals capable of paying OOP expenses, and private companies (Mufti, 2000).Beneﬁts package. Under the uniﬁed health policy of Saudi Arabia, the CEBHI scheme
has predetermined minimum health beneﬁts. The CEBHI is managed by the Council of
Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI).6 With the scheme, employers must pay the
entire premium and cannot choose to cover beneﬁts less than those provided in the
uniﬁed beneﬁts package. In addition, the CEBHI established that if employers did
not subscribe to an insurance plan, or failed to pay insurance premiums for their
workers, they would then be required to pay the premiums as well as a ﬁne and could
lose the right to employ expatriate workers (Cabinet of Ministers, 1999).
However, there are different classes of health insurance plan (Figure 3). Health
insurance providers offer different health insurance packages that range from a basic
plan (each insurer uses a different name for such plans, including C Plan or Balsam
Direct) up to the highest level or elite plan (VIP, Gold Balsam); each with a
corresponding cap on expenditure (Bupa, 2010; Elhout, 2010; Tawuniya, 2010).
Each plan has different afﬁliated medical care providers, hospitals, or clinics, or all
(Bupa, 2010; Elhout, 2010; Tawuniya, 2010). These facilities provide a range of
services, from primary healthcare services to tertiary healthcare services. All insured6The Council of Cooperative Health Insurance is the governmental body responsible for regulating and
monitoring the universality of health insurance coverage. The CCHI website is http://www.cchi.gov.sa/
Pages/default.aspx
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Figure 3. The relationship between different types of healthcare providers and insurance
coverage/categories
e77FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESexpatriate workers can access these providers accordingly, but they may experience
a different quality of medical care. The quality and services provided in one class of
health insurance plan such as the basic plan are unlikely to be the same as those
provided by higher-quality health insurance plans. Figure 3 illustrates the
relationship pertaining to the expatriate worker’s access to different types of
healthcare providers in accordance with the category of insurance coverage. Those
having the highest class of insurance category, such as VIP class, can access all types
of healthcare providers (from healthcare centres and clinics to high-class hospitals or
specialized hospitals), whereas those having the lowest class of insurance category,
such as class C, have very limited access, that is, general hospitals. The basic health
insurance plan has limited afﬁliated hospitals and clinics, and these are known to
provide a poorer quality of service than those accessible via the VIP or golden plans.
In all plans, expatriates can attend one of their listed hospitals directly without going
through a referral system (Bupa, 2010; Elhout, 2010; Tawuniya, 2010). However, if
a patient with a basic plan (class C) requires a clinical procedure provided by a
healthcare provider not within the afﬁliated list of hospitals or clinics, permission
and referral from their insurer must be obtained (Bupa, 2010; Elhout, 2010;
Tawuniya, 2010). In addition, in order to minimize health insurance expenses, some
employers have an agreement with insurers to provide reduced services required by
the uniﬁed medical care beneﬁts package in CEBHI, and some would limit the health
insurance plan to one or two speciﬁc clinics. However, there is no published
empirical evidence regarding the actual implementation of the CEBHI scheme.
A further concern regarding the CEBHI beneﬁts package is that the scheme has a
ﬁxed predetermined co-payment for outpatients and other services. The co-payment
towards the invoice has been determined by the new policy (CCHI, 2009b).
However, it is not clear whether the employee’s co-payment is affordable in relation
to salary. The average expatriate salary in the private sector was less than $270 per
month (Central Department of Statistics and Information, 2008), and it is not clear if© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: e64–e82.
e78 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.this includes housing allowance. An expatriate must pay an average of 10%
(specialist physician’s fees) or 30% (consultant physician fees) of their salary to
cover the co-payment, excluding the cost of transportation and other expenses.
The maximum amount they can pay is $26.67 for specialist visit fees or $40 for a
consultant visit. According to WHO, the co-payment is considered to be catastrophic
if it is more than 40% of a household’s income (Carrin and James, 2004). Further
investigation would be required to determine the extent by which the co-payment
is a barrier to accessing medical care.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPULSORY
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
The literature review and data on health ﬁnancing from the WHO health expenditure
database can help in identifying some ﬁnancial implications of the CEBHI scheme
on both the supply and demand sides of healthcare services. From the supply side,
the density of health personnel in Saudi Arabia per 10 000 people is still less than
that of upper-middle-income countries and most GCC countries (the density of
physicians, dentists and nurses per 10 000 population is 9.39, 2.3 and 21 in Saudi
Arabia versus 17, 10 and 26 in upper-middle-countries in 2008 (Table 1). The
number of beds per 10 000 people in Saudi Arabia and GCC countries is less than
that in upper-middle-income countries (the number of beds per 10 000 people is
around 22 in Saudi Arabia versus 36 in upper-middle-income countries in 2009).
Although (through CEBHI) Saudi Arabia is one of the few GCC countries to reform
its private healthcare system and reduce dependence on government resources,
government expenditure on health still dominates total health expenditure, and
private expenditure is lower than expected. For example, government expenditure
on health not only provides the majority of the healthcare budget but also has the
highest percentage of government expenditure on health amongst GCC countries.
Additionally, the expenditure on health as a percentage of general government
expenditure increased after the implementation of CEBHI from 8.4% in 2007 to
8.8% in 2008 (WHO 2010). On the other hand, the actual proportion of private
expenditure from total health expenditure has not changed much. Indeed, all things
being equal, private expenditure on healthcare ought to be more than 30% of the
total expenditure on health as elaborated earlier. However, low private healthcare
expenditure, relative to the population covered by the CEBHI scheme, may be
symptomatic of the workload of private providers and the poor quality of private
healthcare services; both of which are seen as a potential obstacle in accessing
healthcare (Al-Osaimi, 2009). This is borne out by a study in Saudi Arabia, which
reported that the low quality of services, accessibility problems and delays in
providing services were anticipated challenges that the CEBHI scheme would face
after implementation (Al-Omar, 2005). Furthermore, a recent study stressed the
importance of regulating the quality of health services in the private sector in Saudi
Arabia after the implementation of CEBHI (Al-Sharqi and Abdullah, 2012).
From the demand for medical care perspective, the CEBHI has had a clear positive
impact on payment methods: OOP payments have decreased, and private insurance
expenditure has increased (WHO, 2009). However, there is a risk that the price of© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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e79FINANCING HEALTHCARE IN GCC COUNTRIESpremiums will increase, because currently, there is no control mechanism for
ensuring that high-risk expatriate workers will be accepted by insurers. In addition,
health insurance companies provide cover on the basis of risk-based pooling similar
to voluntary health insurance; that is, insurers charge different premiums for
different risk categories and different company sizes. Therefore, the premiums for
small employers are critical to the success of the CEBHI scheme, mainly because
the growth rate of small companies in Saudi Arabia between 2006 and 2007 having
less than ﬁve employees is the highest at 26.1%, representing 51.6% of the total
number of expatriate workers (GOSI, 2008).
A big challenge on the supply side is that private hospitals are concentrated within
the main cities of Saudi Arabia. For example, the cities of Riyadh and Jeddah have
48% of the private hospitals and 55.5% of the total hospital beds (MOH, 2007). In
addition, approximately 53% of the nation’s dispensaries and 74% of the private
clinics are prevalent in these two regions (MOH, 2007). On the other hand, the in-
surers were one of the main barriers of access to medical care. The Cooperative
Health Insurance Council in 2008 and 2009 reported that the highest percentage of
complaints received were in relation to insurance companies (CCHI, 2008; CCHI,
2009a, 2009b). This fact can be attributed to the under-development of the insurance
industry. Although the law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies
allows a minimum capital of SR100m for insurance companies and SR200m for
companies undertaking insurance and reinsurance activities, most companies have
capital below SR100m (Agency, 2008). However, it is not clear whether the ﬁxed
co-payment is ﬁnancially catastrophic for some expatriates, considering that the
average expatriate salary is $270 monthly.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The three main characteristics of GCC countries identiﬁed in this paper are high-
income governments, dominant expatriate populations and under-development of
the healthcare system, including healthcare ﬁnancing. These characteristics impact
on the healthcare ﬁnancing strategies of GCC countries in three ways. Firstly,
GCC governments provide the majority share of the health budget, similar to high-
income countries. Secondly, GCC countries use different strategies to control
expatriate costs, but some of these strategies lead to increased OOP expenses, which
is a characteristic of low-income countries. Thirdly, healthcare ﬁnancing systems in
GCC countries are still being developed, as they ﬁnance most of their public services
(including healthcare services) with revenue from natural resources (i.e. oil or gas).
Although GCC countries are examining different options for ﬁnancing healthcare
services, they have not yet identiﬁed or implemented any approaches to achieve this
objective and are at the stage of searching and learning from one another’s
experiences. Additionally, some of their healthcare indicators are identiﬁable with
those from below upper-middle-income countries.
The GCC countries need to reform their healthcare systems including health
ﬁnancing. For example, the distribution of healthcare expenditure may well be
inequitable. In the context of the Saudi Arabian healthcare system, spending on© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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e80 A. ALKHAMIS ET AL.healthcare is likely to be inequitable because of the fragmentation of the healthcare
budget amongst different government agencies. The beneﬁts offered by the non-
MOH agencies are more extensive than those covered by the MOH; therefore, the
beneﬁt incidence of the system could potentially be improved either by combining
these governmental systems or allocating the budget on the basis of a per capita need
formula (Schieber, 2005).
In addition, the current ﬁnancing structure in GCC countries leads to
misalignment between the budget and the demand for services. Anew relationship
between the purchasing organization and providers must be established in which
there is enhanced monitoring and control of healthcare expenditures. However, to
facilitate this, GCC countries, as is the case in Qatar, must develop a system of
national health accounts.
Furthermore, equity in access to healthcare has to be an objective in any
healthcare service, including GCC countries. Under the law in most GCC countries,
including Saudi Arabia, the government is obliged to provide free healthcare
services to its citizens, whereas the employers are obliged to provide healthcare
services to the expatriate employees. Therefore, the big challenge for GCC countries
is how to devise a health insurance scheme that guarantees equitable access to
healthcare for all residents whilst ﬁnancing healthcare differently. Although Saudi
Arabia is one of the few GCC countries to reform its private healthcare system
and reduce dependence on government resources, government expenditure on health
still dominates total health expenditure, and private expenditure is lower than
expected. However, the mode of payments has changed mainly by reducing OOP
payments. There is also a risk that the price of premiums will increase, and currently,
there is no mechanism for ensuring that high-risk expatriate workers will be accepted
by insurers. Therefore, it is recommended that a solidarity fund be established to
absorb high-risk workers and a policy be developed that will allow small companies
to be united as one pool, in order to increase their appeal to insurers and reduce
premiums. Finally, the CEBHI scheme might have other implications requiring
further study, such as whether the CEBHI increases access to healthcare for
expatriates in the private sector, and whether the co-payments paid by expatriates
are catastrophic for some.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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